Tag Archives: Big Three

“Panhandlers!”

My old college roommate Jared Polis, soon to be a Democratic Congressman from Colorado, pens a terrific op-ed in today’s Wall Street Journal offering a unique non-bail-out solution to the automobile meltdown.

By waiving the future capital-gains tax on all investments in the automobile industry, we enhance the projected return models and therefore the likely occurrence of a privately funded “bailout.” There are turnaround firms and funds, and they are experts at what needs to be done. Tax exemption for gains would certainly get their attention. It also wouldn’t cost taxpayers anything because it only forgoes future government revenues that wouldn’t exist absent this incentive.

The Anti-Innovation Bailout

Tom Hazlett tells it like it is:

The real problem entailed by the auto-maker subsidies will never be discussed because it can never be seen. The opportunity cost of shovelling capital to companies such as GM is that companies such as Boeing or United Technologies or Disney or start-ups unknown will be unable to use it to fund their projects. Propping up today’s US car manufacturers means beating down tomorrow’s economic star. In an era of technological leaps, those emergent stars tend to be leapers. The bail-out puts the public’s chips on the former, pulling stakes from innovative rivals.

Bailing on Free Trade

Matthew Slaughter of Dartmouth’s Tuck School, one of today’s best thinkers on trade and globalization, says the consequences of any Big Three Auto bailout go far beyond the initial price tag.

First, it would hurt foreign direct investment in the U.S. and thus the insourcing of U.S. jobs:

In 2006 these foreign auto makers (multinational auto or auto-parts companies that are headquartered outside of the U.S.) employed 402,800 Americans. The average annual compensation for these employees was $63,538.

At the head of the line of sustainable auto companies stands Toyota. In its 2008 fiscal year, it earned a remarkable $17.1 billion world-wide and assembled 1.66 million motor vehicles in North America. Toyota has production facilities in seven states and R&D facilities in three others. Honda, another sustainable auto company, operates in five states and earned $6 billion in net income in 2008. In contrast, General Motors lost $38.7 billion last year.

Across all industries in 2006, insourcing companies registered $2.8 trillion in U.S. sales while employing 5.3 million Americans and paying them $364 billion in compensation.

Second, Slaughter says, a Big Three bailout could hurt U.S.-headquartered multinationals:

these companies employ more than 22 million Americans and account for a remarkable 75.8% of all private-sector R&D in the U.S. Their success depends on their ability to access foreign customers. . . .

This access to foreign markets has been good for America. But it won’t necessarily continue. The policy environment abroad is growing more protectionist. . . .

Will a U.S.-government bailout go ignored by policy makers abroad?

No. A bailout will likely entrench and expand protectionist practices across the globe, and thus erode the foreign sales and competitiveness of U.S. multinationals. And that would reduce these companies’ U.S. employment, R&D and related activities. That would be bad for America.

Rising trade barriers would also hurt the Big Three, all of which are multinational corporations that depend on foreign markets. In 2007, GM produced more motor vehicles outside North America than in — 5.02 million, or 54% of its world-wide total. 

Finally, a bail-out further endangers the dollar:

Will a federal bailout that politicizes American markets bolster foreign-investor demand for U.S. assets?

Not likely. Instead, America runs the risk of creating the kind of “political-risk premium” that investors have long placed on other countries — and that would reduce demand for U.S. assets and thereby the value of the U.S. dollar.

Read the whole thing.

Bailing out Detroit means bailing on free trade and American innovation.

A Better Auto Bailout

Instead of never-ending rolling bailouts for years to come, Holman Jenkins thinks a simple tweak could fix the Big Three:

Washington wouldn’t have to find the courage to amend the labor laws to end the Detroit Three’s captivity by the UAW. Nor would it have to repeal the CAFE rules that are now a sacred cow. It would simply have to allow auto makers to meet the fuel economy standards with any mix of autos made in domestic or overseas factories. . . .

For 30 years, to make and sell the large vehicles that earn their profits, the Detroit Three have been effectively required to build small cars in high-wage, UAW factories, though it means losing money on every car. (That — not some perverse desire to make bad cars — is why they skimped for decades on styling, engineering and materials in their family sedans.)